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Summary:  
 
Context is acknowledged as a significant feature of a negotiation. Background 
information about the relationship between the parties, available resources and 
organisational data are readily identifiable as key components of the contextual make-
up of negotiations. However, information deriving from the broader setting of the 
negotiation may be less well-utilised or simply taken-for-granted in a negotiation. 
This paper suggests that this broader setting, discussed under the rubric of 
governance, is a critical facet of the context of negotiations. The paper explores the 
notion of governance and traces its relationship with negotiation. It then offers a 
framework that sets out the different governance approaches and allows for 
identifying and assessing potential negotiation strategies according to the dominant 
governance mode. It concludes that while a mix of governance approaches may be 
present in negotiations, identifying ‘ideal types’ or dominant governance modes 
assists in choosing appropriate strategies for successfully undertaking negotiations.        
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up of negotiations. However, information deriving from the broader setting of the 
negotiation may be less well-utilised or simply taken-for-granted in a negotiation. 
This paper suggests that this broader setting, discussed under the rubric of 
governance, is a critical facet of the context of negotiations. The paper explores the 
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identifying and assessing potential negotiation strategies according to the dominant 
governance mode. It concludes that while a mix of governance approaches may be 
present in negotiations, identifying ‘ideal types’ or dominant governance modes 
assists in choosing appropriate strategies for successfully undertaking negotiations.        
 
Introduction 
 
The success of negotiation strategies depends crucially on the planning preparations 
of the negotiators (Hawkins and Hudson, 1990). A critical part of planning is 
developing an understanding of the context of the negotiation, usually achieved 
though gathering and assessing available information about the circumstances of the 
negotiated issue (Thompson, 1991). Negotiators then build their tactics by reference 
to the background information about the situation under negotiation, together with 
their knowledge of the negotiation team members (Barry and Friedman, 1998 
Weingart, Hyder, and Prietula, 1996). However, these contextual elements remain 
focused on the particulars of the organisation or negotiating team and are less directed 
at the strategic level and the overarching structural and relational environment in 
which the negotiation takes place. 
 
The aim of this paper is to analyse the context of negotiations and to put forward a 
possible framework that may offer a broader, more comprehensive understanding of 
the elements and associated outcomes of negotiation strategies. Context is a well 
accepted element of the negotiation mix and used as a basis for developing 
negotiating strategies, particularly in the planning stage (Hudson and Hawkins, 1995). 
However, as we will argue, the crafting of a strategic response to context at the level 
of overarching governance mode is less well developed. The paper sets out and 
discusses the array of governance mechanisms as a way of identifying key modes or 
‘ideal types’ for governance and offers a suite of responses which enable the 
development of appropriate strategies for negotiations. In doing so, this paper begins 
to develop a contingency framework for negotiation across the different governance 
models. 
 
Interest in both the theory and practice of negotiation has increased in recent times 
and there is a trend in current thinking in that studies are returning to a consideration 
of the social aspects of negotiation (Bazerman, Curhan, Moore and Valley, 2000). We 
argue, in this paper, that a social aspect that requires greater consideration is how 
different modes of social organisation (governance) impact on negotiation. 
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This paper first presents theories of governance and the three principle governance 
modes are elucidated. The major forms of governance are bureaucracy or state, 
market and network and these differing approaches to social organisation are argued 
to have a direct bearing on the calculations required to develop successful negotiation 
strategies. Theoretical perspectives on negotiation are then explored prior to 
examining the relevance of considering negotiation through a governance lens. The 
paper concludes that the concept governance extends conventional notions of context 
in negotiations. The governance framework developed in this review is suggested to 
offer a new way of mapping the contextual environment and provides a useful tool for 
selecting possible negotiation strategies.   
 
Negotiation 
 
Negotiation has been defined as “a process of potentially opportunistic interaction by 
which two or more parties, with some apparent conflict, seek to do better through 
jointly decided action than they could otherwise” (Lax and Sebenius, 1986:11). 
Negotiation literature emphasises the importance of planning and that planning and 
preparing involves considering all the circumstances around a negotiation.  
 
A consideration of context is therefore critical in negotiation as it defines the 
boundaries in which a negotiation is to occur and shapes the rules under which a 
negotiation is conducted. Numerous studies have previously considered context 
and/or situational differences and their impact on negotiation together with important 
implications for the behaviour of parties in conflict (O’Connor, 1997; Olekalns, 
2002). These studies have focused on contextual aspects such as temporal and social 
frameworks (Thompson and Hastie, 1990; Olekalns, 2002; Gelfand et al, 2006), 
physical environment (see for example Boulle, 1995) and the history and prior 
relationship between the parties (Harwood, 2002). Such studies have examined issues 
including power, future expectations of the relationship between the parties and 
accountability to others (Bazerman, et. al 2000)). However, these elements can be 
determined at the level of the negotiation itself, and have mainly focused on the 
interactions between the parties/actors. This paper expands on this body of work by 
considering negotiation context from a more macro perspective and examining the 
effect of the broader environment through a governance lens. In offering a 
conceptualisation of the possible impact and import of governance on negotiation, this 
paper advances prior theory on negotiating within different governance frameworks. 
 
The global business environment is today characterised by three primary governance 
arrangements – state (bureaucracies), markets and networks. Each of these 
governance modes are underpinned by a set of assumptions that guide the nature of  
relationships and their operation, including, we argue, the nature of negotiations 
within the relationship and in regard to the negotiation relationship. Organisations, 
and individuals working within them, need to understand the various governance 
modes and their dominant organising properties and be able to adjust various aspects 
of their business practices to accommodate for different views on business operations 
to achieve organisational success. A critical business practice is negotiation, yet it has 
received relatively limited theoretical and empirical attention within the changing 
business environment.  
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Much of the current negotiation literature has focused on analysis of the influence of 
information technology as a negotiation medium, on multi-cultural negotiation and an 
increasing number of studies that identify the specificity of industry context and its 
influence on negotiation, for example, complex infrastructure negotiations. These 
literatures collectively have recognised changes to the environment in which 
negotiations take place and the tools available to undertake such negotiations, but 
have not systematically recognised or coherently theorised the emerging governance 
mechanisms under which all organisations, and the people within them, now operate 
and the impact this has on negotiation practice. 
 
The coming together of two such diverse fields of research may appear at first to be 
irreconcilable. Cohen (2008) points out that negotiation research and analysis has 
tended to focus on the individual and on individual behaviour, while governance 
research is interested in institutions and institutional change. However, like Cohen 
(2008) we too identify many similarities in the elements of negotiation and 
governance theories that bear further consideration. 
 
History of Negotiation and Context 
 
Since the publication of Walton and McKersie’s (1965) seminal work on labour 
negotiation, the analysis of negotiations has largely been focused on the distinction 
between distributive and integrative negotiation strategies. Distributive strategies are 
those that view negotiation as a zero-sum or fixed-pie game. The aim of a distributive 
strategy is to gain maximum for self or to win the negotiation at the expense or loss of 
the other party. Distributive negotiations rely on non-disclosure of information and 
the disguising of true positions. Conversely, integrative negotiations are those that are 
interest-based and a major objective is to uncover interests so as to maximum joint, 
rather than individual gain (Lewicki, Saunders and Barry, 2006). 
 
Research subsequent to 1965 has tended to find that negotiations are rarely 
completely distributive or integrative but that most negotiations, particularly complex 
ones, either flow through various stages of integration and distribution (Walton and 
McKersie, 1965) or, that negotiations are far more dynamic than stage or phase 
models suggest and that integrative and distributive tactics occur rapidly as a response 
to each other and are therefore interdependent processes (Lax and Sebenius, 1986; 
Putnam, 1990). 
 
It has been argued that certain contexts lend themselves better to either integrative or 
distributive tactics. Monetary negotiations where there is no ongoing relationship with 
the other party are circumstances under which distributive tactics are considered most 
appropriate. Such situations require no attendance to establishing and maintaining a 
relationship with the other party and therefore the negotiation can proceed based 
solely on driving the best bargain through using whatever tactics will gain the most 
significant portion of the ‘fixed pie’ (Lytle and Brett, 1999; Kersten, 2001). 
Conversely, in negotiations with ongoing relationships and more than one issue, 
integrative tactics that uncover and focus on interests are considered optimal 
(Lewicki, et al. 2006). 
 
More recently some authors have sought an alternative to the integrative/distributive 
dichotomy arguing that it does not fully explain some of the behaviours occurring 
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within negotiations in the current business, and particularly negotiations that involve 
international relations, may require different views on negotiation and supplementary 
behaviours. Shapiro (2000) suggests one method as ‘supplemental joint 
brainstorming’. Similarly, Niemann (2006) proposes that supplementary to traditional 
integrative and distributive negotiation strategies that Habermas’ concept of 
communicative action be reconsidered and that negotiating parties need first to enter 
into genuine debate so as to reach ‘mutual understanding by entering into a reasoned 
and argumentative discourse about valid behaviour’. In this way, part of the 
negotiation process relates to forming similar world views. It could be argued that 
communicative action is not strictly negotiation, however, it bears all the 
characteristics in that parties have some conflict, in this instance of behaviour and 
view, and that parties can improve their situation through jointly decided action. 
 
The world view with which negotiators enter a negotiation has implications for the 
tactics chosen and therefore the process of negotiations as well as their outcomes in 
that the way in which the negotiation is framed is central to the meaning negotiators 
place on the negotiation (Putnam, 1990). Several models of framing exist; however, a 
useful model is that of Ury, Brett and Goldberg (1988) that proposes negotiators 
consider negotiation through one of three lenses – interests, rights and power.. 
Individuals base their approach to negotiations on past experiences that shape their 
understanding of their environment. Therefore, we argue that individuals who 
undertake negotiation are influenced by the institutional arrangements, and therefore 
the corresponding governance mode, under which they operate. Each of the ideal 
governance modes construe interests, rights and power in different ways. 
 
Bazerman and Neale (1983) draw attention to issues of rationality inherent in earlier 
works, particularly game theory and its wide use as an analysis tool for negotiations. 
They argued that behaviour in negotiation is often irrational and that this is influenced 
by (1) the way in which issues are framed in a negotiation, (2) overconfidence in 
judgement, (3) a lack of ability to take the perspective of the other party, (4) 
escalation of commitment to a failing action, and (5) a bias towards viewing 
negotiations as a fixed sum game rather than uncovering any integrative potential. 
One of their key suggestions for improving negotiation outcomes was the importance 
of choosing a negotiator based on characteristics “other than job title or elected 
position” (p. 64). An issue then for bureaucratic governance is that negotiators are 
often selected on the basis of their job title or seniority meaning that such negotiators 
may bring with them those characteristics non-conducive to a good negotiation result.  
 
The influence of context on negotiations has been considered as emanating from a 
number of structural variables including power, deadlines and the opportunity for 
integrative solutions as well as from other people (Neale and Northcraft, 1991). 
Deadlines, opportunities and people are elements of the actual negotiation as it 
unfolds, whereby concepts of power, while influenced by the negotiation, are also 
influenced by social construction and prior understanding. Fisher (1983) identifies a 
number of categories of power including, among others, (1) the power of good 
relationships, (2) the power of a good alternative to negotiating, (3) the power of 
legitimacy and (4) the power of commitment. Power is influential in negotiation 
outcomes and under different governance arrangements, different categories of power 
can be seen to be more critical. For example, relationships are central to network 
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governance arrangements, therefore the power attributable to good relationships 
becomes more central. 
 
Negotiation through a Governance Lens 
 
The linking of governance and negotiation is not entirely new. Lewicki (2006), for 
example, points out that negotiation has tended to be theorised and analysed within a 
market context but that other contexts exist that have not yet been broadly considered. 
The challenge of theorising negotiation in contexts other than markets, in particular 
different governance systems, has only very recently been taken up.  Research and 
theoretical development to the topic have been incremental and tended to focus on 
one aspect rather than develop an overarching framework for considering negotiation 
within the context of governance, to the detriment of understanding the utility of a 
suite of responses to the different governance approaches. 
 
Cohen (2008) identifies ‘new governance’ as being associated with democratic values 
and popular deliberation and considers that this depiction has many similarities with 
current normative models of negotiation. Drawing on excerpts from The Negotiator’s 
Fieldbook, (Schneider, Kupfman and Honeyman, 2006) Cohen (2008) identifies the 
growing trend in normative models of negotiation towards participative, creative 
problem solving models likened to Habermas’ “Communicative Action”. Such 
approaches to negotiation are non-strategic and rational (Cohen, 2008) and their 
success is reliant on: 
 
– Actors having a shared and common lifeworld 
– Actors recognition of one another as equals, with equal access to discourse 
– Actors’ ability to empathise 
 
Interestingly, her study of the negotiations surrounding large dam projects identified 
that, even where creative problem solving methods were used, negotiations still 
became ‘bogged down’ on financial matters and in particular the amount of 
compensation payable to individuals affected by the construction of large dams. We 
contend that this indicates firstly that the non-rational elements of negotiation and 
negotiators identified through game theory remain problematic and that, even within a 
collaborative, network environment elements of the market persist. 
 
Negotiation today focuses on the need to be able to collaborate and joint-problem 
solve. These characteristics are also inherent, as Cohen (2008) argues, in ‘new 
governance’ models or networks where the central tenet is the need for genuine 
collaboration. The argument is cogent, however what is not clearly delineated is that 
‘new governance’ is not aligned with negotiation theory in general, but with very 
specific characteristics of particular types of negotiations and that other governance 
modes may align with other types of negotiation.  
 
A study by Ness and Haugland (2004) examined how governance mechanisms and 
negotiation behaviour co-adapted during the period of a contractual relationship with 
a fixed time period. Their findings indicate how governance mechanisms of price 
incentives, authority and trust/relational norms developed and coalesced over time. 
Ness and Haugland’s study was conducted within a micro-environment of a single 
contractual relationship. However, at a macro level this co-existence or mixture of 
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governance modes has been observed in the broader policy domain. Bogason and 
Musso (2006) offer that interorganizational governance arrangements require new 
relational approaches and suggest that negotiations need to take longer, are not 
locationally-bound and require new tasks such as brokers and drawing in a wider 
array of actors. 
 
Governance Modes as Determinants of Negotiation Context & Style 
 
Governance is essentially the purposive means for guiding and steering a society 
(Kooiman, 1993). It is about how processes and mechanisms for social organisation 
are arrayed and made operational, that is, mechanisms for deciding which decisions 
are made, how resources allocated and, the form of coordination to facilitate this 
process. At its core, governance is a mode of social coordination. Three main or ideal 
modes have been identified – the state or bureaucracy, the market and civil networks 
(Thompson, Frances, Levacic and Mitchell, 1991; Ouchi, 1980). Each of these modes 
represents alternative ways of organising society and is underpinned by a set of 
ideological assumptions and principles that guide their integrating mechanisms and 
optimal operating conditions. We argue here that, from a negotiation perspective, each 
of these three ideal modes can be considered in relation to the particular frames that 
parties bring to the negotiating table, and the form - interests, rights or power – such 
framing takes.  
The state or bureaucratic model relies on organisations working through hierarchical 
relationships. In this model ‘legitimate’ authority provides the means of integrating 
and regulating the relationships between actors into a functional system of operation 
(Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998; Considine, 2001). Decision-making within this process 
is highly exclusive and communication is formalised and directed downwards through 
the chain of command (Ansell, 2000). The strategic arrangements through which 
outcomes are realised are generally procedures, rules and regulations, mandates and 
legislation and routines. The influence orientation in the bureaucratic mode is 
essentially based on a reliance on decision-making elites with a dependent chain of 
interaction. 
Bureaucratic governance is most often associated with the power and influence of the 
state; however, many large private sector corporations operate within bureaucratic 
governance modes. At this time we focus on negotiation as it relates to the state rather 
than private sector bureaucracies. The current focus is on ideal or ‘pure’ governance 
modes. Private sector bureaucracies are therefore considered later in this paper as they 
fall within hybrid arrangements of both bureaucracy and market. 
The implications for negotiations within state models of governance are that they 
occur under conditions related to the need to (1) address public interest, (2) abide by 
strictly defined rules and (3) involve a core group of ‘legitimate’ negotiation 
players/actors who work to regulation and are not easily able to bring in new offers as 
the negotiating party is not always able to make final decisions.  
Negotiation in this governance mode therefore relies on top-down/vertical command 
and control methods, strict chains of command and management that takes place in 
intra-organisational settings. The aim of such negotiations is to bring about the 
equitable distribution of created value through procedures that ensure consistent 
outcomes for all stakeholders. Stakeholders to negotiations within bureaucratic or 
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state modes of governance are not active participants to the negotiation process. 
However, negotiations occur within the public domain. Negotiations therefore take 
place in a controlled environment of authorised negotiators where outcomes are 
achieved through adherence to policy and procedure.  
 
In contrast, the market mode of governance centres on private sector organisations 
operating through contractual transactions based on the concepts of demand and 
supply. For the market model the integrating mechanism is the formalised, mostly 
legal, contractual arrangements that use price signals to bring dispersed suppliers and 
purchasers together for short and highly specified exchanges. Management in this 
context is through arms-length transactions using written contracts, formal agreements 
and based on reliable performance and formal relationships. The key is self-interest 
co-ordinated through the invisible hand of supply and demand. The orientation of 
influence in this sense is independent, with individuals focussed on establishing 
strategic linkages to secure optimal outcomes while retaining an autonomous stance. 
Management is based on rationality and self-preservation. Transactions occur among 
businesses because each individual organisation is unable or unwilling to provide 
internally the resources they require and therefore must establish relationships with 
others. Although these linkages are thin and sporadic (Cooke and Morgan, 1993), the 
existence of a relationship aspect begins to move away from the vertical emphasis of 
hierarchy towards the horizontal.  
 
Negotiation here is shareholder focused and self-interested. Unlike bureaucratic 
governance arenas that address public interest, markets seek to create value for profit 
maximisation. Interested parties in market negotiations are therefore driven by 
individual gain. Relationships within the negotiations sphere in this mode are set by 
the market and are short term as purchasers seek out the needed resources from 
multiple suppliers. Negotiations occur to obtain needed resources at a price that 
delivers maximum profit resulting in negotiations that are distributive – win/lose in 
nature. Each party seeks to gain maximum return for themselves rather than 
necessarily seeking ways to ‘expand the pie’ and achieve maximum joint benefit.  
 
Network governance mode also has a horizontal rather than a hierarchical organising 
principle, the relationships and sphere of influence are interdependent drawing on 
social/communal relationships based on exchanges underpinned by the building of 
trust, reciprocity and mutual benefit. In this model communication is thick and the 
parties either have, or try to establish, extensive long-term knowledge of each other 
and their organisations (Ansell, 2000). Relationships, while valued as ends in and of 
themselves are also leveraged to achieve synergistic outcomes that are not possible in 
single organisation or committee operating modes. 
 
Negotiation within the network governance mode is therefore not top-down and does 
not centre on the concept of self–interest. Instead the idea of network negotiation is 
very much focused on building relationships in which trust and reciprocity come to 
the fore. Stakeholders within networked arrangements are active participants in 
negotiations and as such are significantly influential in how negotiations take place 
and in their ultimate outcome. This relationship can be considered in light of 
Bovaird’s (2007) depicition of user and community coproduction where services (or 
goods) are provided through “regular, long-term relationships between 
professionalized service providers (in any sector) and service users … where all 
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parties make substantial resource contributions” (p. 847). Relationships between the 
multiple stakeholders/negotiating parties are collaborative and negotiations are 
integrative in that they focus on interests with an aim to maximise joint, rather than 
individual gain. 
 
Putting It All Together 
 
The previous section has demonstrated that each of the three ideal governance modes 
operate in different types of domains, exhibit different relationships and integrating 
mechanisms (Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998; Brown and Keast, 2003) and thus rely on 
different integrating mechanisms to lead to desirable outcomes.  Further, it has been 
established that for each of these governance modes there is a need to be aware that 
there is an associated dominant negotiating strategy, which must be clearly 
understood in order to maximise outcomes, read negotiation and adjust behaviours in 
accordance with a dominant governance mode.  
 
Table 1, provides a schema to articulate each of the governance characteristics and 
identify where each of the aspects is located and how the origins impact on the ways 
of working adopted. In doing so it establishes the terrain on which each of the 
governance modes may operate. 
 
Table 1: Governance and Negotiation Schema 
 
Governance 
Regime  
State Market Social Networks  
Domain of action
And interest  
Public Domain 
Public Interest  
Private Domain 
Private interest  
Civic Domain 
Community Interest  
Integrating 
mechanisms and 
processes 
Centralised/legitimate 
authority hierarchy, 
Procedures, rules, 
regulations and 
legislation 
Exchange 
relationships 
Formalised, legal 
contractual 
arrangements  
 
Social/communal relationships
Social charter 
Compacts 
Negotiating Tables 
  
Influence 
orientation 
Dependent Independent Interdependent 
Dominant  
Negotiation  
Procedural  Arms-length  
Negotiated 
interactions, 
Performance 
specification, 
Bargained 
outcomes    
Relational Negotiation 
Interest based  
Collaborative  
 
 
The above discussion has focused on ideal governance modes. It should be noted 
however that the three governance types represent idealised governance modes and 
that in practice there is almost no pure type. For example there can, in fact, be 
hierarchies and/or markets as parts of networks, market arrangements in state modes 
and hierarchies in markets (Ouchie, 1980; Larmour, 1998; Lowndes and Skelcher, 
1998).  The implications for negotiation are that Table 1 represents a beginning 
framework for negotiation practice based on governance modes.  
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Thus, as Bradach and Eccles (1991: 289) observe; “The ideal types … serve as a 
useful starting point … The assumption that these mechanisms are mutually 
exclusive, however, obscures rather than clarifies our understanding … Price, 
authority and trust are combined with each other in assorted ways in the empirical 
world”. Further, as Lowndes and Skelcher (1998) have demonstrated the form of 
governance can shift according to the particular life cycle in which an organisation or 
network is situated. That is, governance modes can overlap and even co-exist 
throughout the lifecycle of an endeavour, including the term of a negotiation and the 
process and relationship development within negotiations are arguably a factor in 
changing governance modes (Ness and Haugland 2004).  In addition, all three 
governance modes can be used simultaneously.  The ability to shift between or draw 
from different governance modes allows for the establishment of hybrid 
organisational arrangements and provides the need for negotiation strategies that are 
able to bridge the gap. 
 
As pressures for flexible and adaptable organisational forms continue, hybrid 
arrangements will proliferate and require researchers and administrators to establish 
more solid analytical and practice frameworks for negotiation within these mixed 
entities. As a first step in this process, there is a need to differentiate between hybrid 
inter-organisational networks that are primarily strategic and independent 
arrangements and, hybrid networks comprised of interdependent entities.  
 
Hybrid Organisations, Hybrid Networked Arrangements and Negotiation: A 
Point of Differentiation  
 
Hybrids are defined as organisational arrangements that draw on more than one 
governance mode and are comprised of mixed institutional arrangements (Borys and 
Jemison, 1989; Powell, 1987; Schaeffer and Loveridge, 2002). That is, by combining 
market contract, formal structural arrangements and relational trust, hybrids operate at 
the intersection of the idealised models and set the context for mixing and matching 
between the domains. The capacity to mix and match across governance regimes and 
associated structural arrangements provides the potential for a myriad of combinations 
and re-combinations of hybrid inter-organisational types (Kanter, 1989; Borys and 
Jemison, 1989).  
 
Neale and Northcraft (1991, p. 177) present a negotiation framework which includes 
two broad categories: context (static) and negotiator (dynamic) effects. An important 
feature of the negotiation context, it is argued, is its integrating potential. Hybrid 
governance modes arguably provide some explanation for the dynamic potential for 
integration within a negotiation situation while shifting governance modes such as 
that defined by Ness and Haugland (2004) argue against Neale and Northcraft’s 
(1991) observation of a static context. Governance may therefore prove a useful new 
lens for understanding the dynamic interdependence of negotiation strategies 
identified by Putnam (1990).  
 
Conclusion 
 
As part of the planning process and strategising for negotiations, this paper has argued 
that a broader conceptualisation of context can offer a comprehensive understanding 
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of the different bargaining approaches and clearer assessment of their outcomes. The 
governance framework developed here identifies the governance mode, together with 
the accompanying domains of action and requisite negotiation strategies.    
 
It is contended that, as each governance mode is anchored by a dominant negotiation 
style, calculations about the format, process and progress of negotiations can be 
usefully made. The framework guides selection of negotiation style by identifying 
arenas of influence and integration mechanisms as contextual characteristics. In 
reality, it is acknowledged that the governance modes will be comprised of hybrid 
arrangements. The skill is to assess the mix of governance modes and to adapt to the 
associated governance approaches.     
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